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NOTES
EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION: HOW FAR DOES
NLRB JURISDICTION REACH?
Although it is generally accepted that the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) is an appropriate forum for hearing
certain types of charges involving employment discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,' the question
of whether such discrimination by an employer can independently
constitute an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA)2 remains controversial. In 1969, Judge Skelly
Wright, writing a rather novel opinion for the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in United Packing-
house, Food and Allied Workers International Union, AFL-CIO v.
NLRB, 3 answered that question in the affirmative. A recent NLRB
decision, however, takes issue with Judge Wright's legal
conclusion. 4 In view of the tension between these two approaches,
it is necessary to carefully examine the various legislative,-judicial,
and policy considerations involved in determining the scope of
NLRB jurisdiction in employer discrimination cases.
* Much of the literature in this area focuses on the types of racial discrimination found
to violate the National Labor Relations Act. See, e.g., Boyce, Racial Discrimination and the
National Labor Relations Act, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 232 (1970): Peck, Remedies for Racial Discrimina-
tion in Employment: A Comparative Evaluation of Forums, 46 WASH. L. REv. 455 (1971): Sovern,
The National Labor Relations.Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 563 (1962); Note,
Allocating Jurisdiction over Racial Issues Between the EEOC and the NLRB: A Proposal, 54
CORNELL L. REV. 943 (1969).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970). The stated purpose of the NLRA is the elimination of
"the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce," caused by both
employers and labor organizations,
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they'have occurred by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating
the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id. § 151.
Giving effect to the purpose of the Act, § 158 enumerates the unfair labor practices of
both employers and labor organizations which are prohibited by the Act. Id. § 158.
3 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969); see 57 GEO. L.J. 1313
(1969); 23 VAND. L. REv. 867 (1970).




EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION AS AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE:
THE United Packinghouse DOCTRINE
The United Packinghouse case involved discriminatory treatment
of black and Latin American employees by a Texas cotton process-
ing corporation.5 The union brought unfair labor practice proceed-
ings against the company, charging that it had refused to bargain
in good faith over its racially discriminatory practices.6 The Board
upheld the union's contention, finding the employer in violation of
section 8(a)(5)7 of the NLRA, and ordered the company to begin
good faith bargaining.8 On appeal the company contended that the
Board's order was not supported by the evidence, while the union
claimed that the Board did not go far enough, arguing that the
NLRB should also have found that the company's practice of
discrimination against nonwhite employees itself constituted a vio-
lation of section 8(a)(1) 9 of the Act. The Board cross-petitioned for
enforcement of its original order.10
The court of appeals affirmed the Board's order against the
company and further held that the company's discriminatory prac-
tices constituted a violation of section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. 1' It
5 Evidence indicated that: (1) the company had only a few jobs with guaranteed weekly
salaries, which were all filled by whites; (2) the company's highest hourly rate jobs-S1.80
per hour-were largely filled by whites, and nonwhites were paid less for the same type of
work performed by whites in the higher paying positions; (3) overtime assignments were
consistently denied to nonwhite employees; and (4) white employees received more substan-
tial fringe benefits than nonwhite employees. 416 F.2d at 1132.
6 The union further charged that: (1) the company violated § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA (29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970)) by refusing to bargain over alleged discrimination, and (2) the
company violated § 8(a)(1) (id. § 158(a)(1)) by engaging in "interrogations, threats and
promises" during the weeks before a called strike, "in an effort to undermine the Union's
bargaining power and its capacity to mount a successful strike." 416 F.2d at 1130.
7 Section 8(a)(5) states that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1970).
8 416 F.2d at 1133.
9 Section 8(a)(1) declares that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer...
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
section 157 [NLRA § 7] of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). Thus, to constitute a
violation of § 8(a)(1), the employer conduct must interfere with or restrain the employees in
the exercise of their "right to self organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
- 10 416 F.2d at 1129-30.
" Id. at 1130.
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remanded the case to the Board, however, for hearings on whether
the company in fact had a policy and practice of invidious dis-
crimination on account of race or national origin. If it did, the
Board was to fashion an appropriate remedy. 12 In reaching its
decision, the court of appeals acknowledged the novelty of finding
an employer's policy of discrimination to be an independent viola-
tion of the NLRA. 13 However, noting the Board's activity in exam-
ining charges of union racial discrimination, the court found no
reason to exempt charges of employer racial discrimination from
the Board's jurisdiction.'
4
In order to hold the employer's discrimination to be a violation
of section 8(a)(1), it must be found that the practice inhibits
employees from exercising their statutory right to take concerted
action for their own aid or protection, as guaranteed by section 7 of
the Act.15 The court in United Packinghouse found that the em-
ployees' section 7 rights were thus inhibited by two conse-
quences of the employer's discrimination:
(1) [R]acial discrimination sets up an unjustified clash of interests
between groups of workers which tends to reduce the likelihood
and the effectiveness of their working in concert to achieve their
legitimate goals under the Act; and (2) racial discrimination
creates in its victims an apathy or docility which inhibits them
from asserting their rights against the perpetrator of the
discrimination. 16
12 The issue of whether the discriminatory practices of the company violated § 8(a)(1)
was not litigated before the Board. The court remanded the case to the Board on this issue
even though evidence of racial discrimination had been produced in connection with the
charged violation of § 8(a)(5) for failure to bargain about racial discrimination. Thus, the
question of the company's discriminatory practices had been litigated and the Board did find
that the company discriminated on the basis of race. Nevertheless, the court believed that
the company should have the opportunity to have the issue more fully and directly litigated,
after having been given notice that a § 8(a)(1) violation was at issue. Id. at 1134 n.12.
12 Id. at 1134. The court of appeals, however, noted that the Board had in the past
examined employer racial discrimination in the context of a certification election. The court
cited Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962), in which the Board found that an employer
violated § 8(a)(1) by making flagrant appeals to racial prejudice in an attempt to defeat the
union's bid for certification. 416 F.2d at 1135 n.13; see notes 38-39 and accompanying text
infra.
14 416 F.2d at 1134-35; see notes 43-72 and accompanying text infra.
15 See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
16 416 F.2d at 1135. Sociological and psychological evidence was presented in support
of this conclusion. Id. at 1136-37. But see New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303
U.S. 552 (1938) (association of Negroes picketed store which ignored request to employ
Negro clerks); NLRB v. Baltimore Luggage Co., 387 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1967) (appeals by
NAACP to black employees to endorse union did not undermine results of certification
election wherein union won by heavy majority). In both New Negro Alliance and Baltimore
Luggage, employer discriminatiorm apparently did not create an apathy or docility among
1080 [Vol. 59:1078
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Judge Wright's language apparently supports the theory that an
employer's policy and practice of invidious discrimination based
on race or national origin is a per se interference with section 7
rights and hence a violation of section 8(a)(1).1 7 He concluded that
"the employer's policy of discrimination inevitably sets group against
group, thus frustrating the possibility of effective con-
certed action."' 8 This conclusion, said Judge Wright, seems
"inescapable."' 9
The adoption of a per se rule by the United Packinghouse court,
however, stands opposed to the Board's tendency to avoid per se
rules in determining what constitutes an interference with the
section 7 rights of employees. For example, the Board stated in
Blue Flash Express, Inc.,20 that the standard for determining whether
there has been an interference with section 7 rights should be
independently applied in each factual setting.2' In that case the
Board abandoned the traditional per se rule that an ihterrogation
of employees with respect to union activities interfered with section
7 rights. It was the Board's conclusion that an interference with
those rights was not, in fact, the necessary result of such
interrogations.
22
A recent decision of the NLRB has challenged the seemingly
per se rule announced by the United Packinghouse court. In Jubilee
Manufacturing Co., 23 the union charged that the company violated
sections 8(a)(1) and (3)24 of the NLRA by discriminating solely on
minority group members; rather, it led those who were discriminated against to take
collective action against the employers.
'7 416 F.2d at 1135-36. Some language in the opinion, however, indicates that a per se
rule may not have been intended. Judge Wright phrased the issue in thece terms:
We turn now to the question: can an employer's policy and practice of invidious
discrimination against its employees on account of race or national origin violate
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act? When established as hereinafter
discussed, we answer this question in the affirmative .
Id. at 1134 (emphasis added).
18 Id. at 1136 (emphasis added). For cases in which employer discrimination led to
collective action on the part of the discriminated-against minority, see note 16 supra.
19 416 F.2d at 1136.
20 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954).
21 Id. at 594.
22 Id. For the view that unfair labor practices must be determined on the facts and
circumstances of each case, see NLRB v. Stanton Enterprises, Inc., 351 F.2d 261, 265 (4th
Cir. 1965); NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 339 F.2d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 1964).
23 202 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 82 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973).
24 Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA makes it "an unfair labor practice for an employer...
by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1970); see note 9 supra.
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the basis of sex in granting wage increases and in paying higher
wage rates to male employees. 25 It further alleged that the com-
pany violated section 8(a)(5) by insisting to the point of impasse
during contract negotiations upon a contract provision which pro-
vided the basis for its discriminatory wage policies.26
The Board dismissed the union's complaint under section
8(a)(5), concluding that the evidence failed to establish that the
company refused to bargain about alleged sex discrimination. 27 It
also rejected the union's contention that discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, standing alone, 28 is
"inherently destructive" of employees' section 7 rights, and thus
found that the alleged discrimination did not violate sections
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 29 The Board's position required that the
union provide "actual evidence, as opposed to speculation, of a
nexus between the alleged discriminatory conduct and the inter-
ference with, or restraint of, employees in the exercise of those
rights protected by the Act."30 This position stands in clear opposi-
tion to the legal conclusions of the United Packingho use court.31
In Jubilee, the Board was of the view that employer discrimina-
tion did not inevitably sef group against group. Although discrimi-
nation may have such an effect, the Board pointed out that
continued discriminatory practices may, in fact, cause minority
group members to coalesce, possibly leading to collective action
with nonminority group members.32 In addition to rejecting the
25 82 L.R.R.M. at 1483-84. The charges of discrimination were based on the following
circumstances: under the 1969 contract, the employees were classified by groups which re-
flected wage rates in ascending order from Group I through Group X. Groups I, II, and III
were composed of female employees, Group IV of male employees, and Group V of both
male and female employees. The contract contained language establishing minimum rates of
pay for the different classifications and called for a pay increase after 30 days. Material
handlers, who were all male, had been receiving wages in excess of the minimum for five
years and were customarily granted the 30-day wage increase upon being hired. In the
spring of 1970, the employer gave ten-cent wage increases to two male employees in Group
V. Id.
26 The employer had insisted on retaining the "minimum rates of pay" provision in the
contract. The union rejected this proposal as well as one for reclassification, alleging that the
employer's proposal, as it was to be applied, violated.Title VII of th Civil Rights Act of 1964
(42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970)). 82 L.R.R.M. at 1483-85.
27 82 L.R.R.M. at 1485. The Board concluded that it was the union, if anything, which
prevented meaningful bargaining on the provision in question. Id.; see note 26 supra.
25 82 L.R.R.M. at 1484. The discriminatory practices alleged by the union are described
in notes 25-26 supra.
29 82 L.R.R.M. at 1484.
30 Id.
31 See notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra.
32 82 L.R.R.M. at 1484; see cases cited note 16 supra.
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section 8(a)(1) charge against the company on the aboye grounds,
the Board also found no merit in the union's contention that a
"policy and practice of invidious discrimination in the face of a
union's ineffective efforts to eliminate such discrimination has the
'foreseeable consequence' of discouraging union membership within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) . . .,,3
II
EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION AND THE NLRB:
BASES OF JURISDICTION
The NLRB's determination in Jubilee does not mean that the
Board is necessarily without jurisdiction in cases dealing with
employer discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 34 However, in previous cases, the discriminatory
practices dealt with by the NLRB were collaterally involved with
other unfair labor practices. In Ozan Lumber Co., 35 for example, the
application of a company rule which excluded white employees
from company-owned "colored quarters" for the alleged purpose
of barring union organizers and the president of the union from
the colored area, when contrasted with the nonenforcement of the
rule prior to the advent of the union and with respect to nonem-
ployees not connected with the union, was found discriminatory
and violative of section 8(a)(1).3 1 The Board has also found viola-
tions of section 8(a)(1) in the discharge of employees who picketed
against their company's discriminatory hiring policies. The con-
certed effort of the employees in making this protest was held by
the Board to be activity within the protection of section 7 of the
NLRA.
37
33 82 L.R.R.M. at 1484.
31 See literature cited note I supra.
35 42 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1942).
36 Id. at 1079. In this instance the Board found that the employer's practices clearly
interfered with the § 7 rights of the employees. Since the majority of the employees were
black, it was impossible for white employees alone to organize a bargaining unit which would
be entitled to exclusive recognition. See American Cyanamid Co., 39 N.L.R.B. 1129 (1942)
(company-established racial segregation interfered with § 7 rights).
17 Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 166 N.L.R.B. 551 (1967). In Tanner, unlike the United
Packinghouse case, the violation of § 8(a)(1) resulted from the discharge of two employees
who were engaged in what the Board held to be a protected activity, not merely from the
employer's discriminatory policy. Under the United Packinghouse rationale, it appears that
Tanner Motor Livery would have committed an unfair labor practice even had it not
discharged the employees; that is, its discriminatory policy alone would have constituted an
interference with § 7 rights.
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The NLRB has also heard and decided issues involving racial
discrimination by employers where there has been a
direct relationship between the alleged discrimination and [the
Board's] traditional [function] . . . of conducting elections in
which the employees have the opportunity to cast their ballots
for or against a Union in an atmosphere conducive to the sober
and informed exercise of the franchise.
38
In this context, the Board has determined that flagrant and
inflammatory appeals to racial prejudice made by an employer in
an effort to defeat a union in a certification election will be
grounds, as a violation of section 8(a)(1), for setting aside that
election.
3 9
Where an employer has refused to bargain in good faith over
the elimination of existing or alleged racially discriminatory prac-
tices, the Board has found a violation of section 8(a)(5). 40 In the
context of sex discrimination, the Board, in Edmund A. Gray Co., 41
found an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(5) where an
Enforcement of the Board's order in Tanner was denied, however, on the ground that
the employees' picketing was undertaken without the approval of their collective bargaining
representative and thus was not a protected activity-under § 7 of the NLRA. NLRB v.
Tanner Motor Livery, 416 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969). Because enforcement was denied solely
on this basis, the Board's determination that the employees' protests against their employer's
discriminatory policy was protected activity was not undermined by the court of appeals.
For a description of the conduct necessary to comprise a deprivation of an employee's
§ 7 rights in violation of § 8(a)(1), see note 9 supra.
38 Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 82 L.R.R.M. 1482, 1484 (1972).
The Board's duty to conduct elections to certify exclusive bargaining representatives is
defined in § 9(c)(1) of the NLRA:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as
may be prescribed by the Board ... the Board shall investigate such petition and if
it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting
commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice .... If
the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representa-
tion exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results
thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970).
39 Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962). Here, the union lost the certification
election by a considerable margin after the employer had waged a propaganda campaign in
which it associated the union with "race mixing" and made other appeals to racial prejudice.
The president of Sewell had addressed the employees as follows: "I would object to paying
assessments so the union can promote its political objectives such as the [NAACP] and the
[CORE]." Id. at 67. Compare Sharnay Hosiery Mills, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 750 (1958) (temperate
and factually correct statements with respect to racial issue not basis for setting aside election
results).
40 United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 416
F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969); see Southwestern Pipe, Inc., 179
N.L.R.B. 364, 384 (1969), modified on other grounds, 444 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1971).
41 142 N.L.R.B. 590 (1963).
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employer attempted to bypass bargaining with a union over equal
pay for its female employees by unilaterally eliminating all of the
female employees who worked in its plant at the very time the
union undertook to negotiate equal pay for them. In that same
case the Board found the discharge of the female workers unlawful
under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA because the employer's motiva-
tion for the discharge was the union's attempt to negotiate better
compensation and working standards for the female employees.42
III
THE NLRB AND UNION DISCRIMINATION: BASIS FOR
ANALOGY IN EXTENDING NLRB JURISDICTION
In the I United Packinghouse case, the court noted that the NLRB
had examined charges of union racial discrimination as indepen-
dent violations of the NLRA.4 3 Moreover, it asserted that there was
no reason why employer discrimination should not come within the
scrutiny of the Board as well.44
Discriminatory union practices have been held to violate the
NLRA because of the union's duty under the Act to represent all
bargaining unit employees fairly and impartially. 45 The union's
duty of fair representation was first articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in a decision construing the Railway Labor Act.
46
In a landmark decision, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,4 7 the
Court decided that a union, because it is by statutory authority the
exclusive bargaining agent for a unit of employees, could not enter
into a labor contract that discriminated against black employees in
42 The discharge of the female employees by Edmund A. Gray was clearly an act of
discrimination based on sex. Despite this fact, the Board based its determination of a
§ 8(a)(3) violation on the finding that the discharges were the immediate result of union
activity. 142 N.L.R.B. at 599. Therefore, the charges made by the union in Jubilee are
distinguishable. In the latter case, the union charged that the employer's practice of sex
discrimination by itself amounted to unlawful behavior under §§ 8(a)(1) and (3). See note 25
and accompanying text supra. See also Banker's Warehouse Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1197 (1964)
(discharge of female employee because she joined union constituted violation of §§ 8(a)(1)
and (3)).
43 416 F.2d at 1134-35. For articles-discussing NLRB jurisdiction over cases involving
union discrimination, see note 1 supra.
44 416 F.2d at 1135.
42 See generally Herring, The "'Fair Representation" Doctrine: An Effective Weapon Against
Union Racial Discrimination?, 24 MD. L. REv. 113 (1964); Sovern, supra note I, at 576-614.
46 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970). The Railway Labor Act is the counterpart to the National
Labor Relations Act in the rail and airline industries.
47 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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the unit. Although there is no mention of the duty of fair rep-
resentation in the Railway Labor Act, the Court nonetheless found
that the language of the Act. . . read in the light of the purposes
of the Act, expresses the aim of Congress to impose on the
bargaining representative of a craft or class of employees the
duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of
all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against
them.
4 8
About ten years later, the Supreme Court extended the union's duty
of fair representation to cases arising under the NLRA.4 9 The
language of the NLRA, like that of the Railway Labor Act, is silent
as to this duty.
It was in Miranda Fuel Co. 5 0 that the NLRB first held that a
union's breach of its duty of fair representation was a violation of
the unfair labor practice provisions of the NLRA. Miranda Fuel
itself did not involve discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.51 Nevertheless, the opinion is
significant in that it arms the aggrieved party in such discrimina-
tion cases with the doctrine of fair representation in his appeal for
remedial support from the Board.52 The Board in Miranda Fuel
decided that the union's arbitrary and invidious discrimination
against a white employee who took an early vacation violated
section 8(b)(1)(A)53 of the NLRA. Interpreting section 8(b)(1)(A) in
light of equal protection considerations, the Board concluded that
the section "prohibits labor organizations, when acting in a statu-
18 Id. at 202-03.
49 Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955), rel'g 223 F.2d 739
(5th Cir. 1955).
50 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
51 In Miranda Fuel, the union insisted that its contract with the company required that
an employee lose his seniority position for taking a leave of absence, although with his
employer's consent, before the summer slow period.
52 In later cases involving union racial discrimination, the Board found union unfair
labor practices arising from the breach of the duty of fair representation. See, e.g., United
Rubber Workers, Local 12 (Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.), 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964),
enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); International
Longshoremen's Ass'n (Galveston Maritime Ass'n),-148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964), enforced, 368
F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Independent Metal Workers
Union, Locals 1 & 2 (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
" Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents
to restrain or coerce . . . employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a
labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership therein.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970).
[Vol. 594:10781086
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tory representative capacity, from taking action against any em-
ployee upon considerations or classifications which are irrelevant,
invidious, or unfair. '54 In addition, the Board found that the
union had also violated section 8(b)(2) 55 because its "arbitrary or
irrelevant" discrimination was accomplished by inducing the em-
ployer to engage in the discriminatory. treatment-of the employee. 56
According to the Miranda Fuel decision, an employer who
participates with the union in the breach of the union's duty of fair
representation is derivatively liable under the NLRA. The Board
found that when the employer yielded to the union's demand to
reduce the seniority of the employee, it "interfered with, re-
strained, or coerced" the employee in violation of section 8(a)(1)
and discriminated against the employee in violation of section
8(a)(3). 57 The reasoning of the Board in Miranda Fuel, however,
did not persuade the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
which denied enforcement of the Board's order.58
Despite the Second Circuit's denial of enforcement in Miranda
Fuel, the Board reaffirmed its decision in that case only one year
later in litigation involving racial discrimination by a union. In
Independent Metal Workers Union, Locals 1 and 2 (Hughes Tool Co.), 5 9
the certified local unions declined to process the grievances of
black employees. Relying on Miranda Fuel, the Board found the
union's failure an unfair labor practice in violation of sections
8(b)(1), 8(b)(2), and 8(b)(3) 60 of the NLRA. t
Under the facts of Hughes Tool, the Board's finding of an
8(b)(2) violation appears to be a further extension of the doctrine
54 140 N.L.R.B. at 185.
55 Section 8(b)(2) of the NLRA deems it "an unfair labor practice for a labor organiza-
don or its agents ... (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3)." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970).
56 140 N.L.R.B. at 186.
57 Id. at 185-86.
58 NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172.(2d Cir. 1963). Speaking for the court,.
Judge Medina acknowledged the union's duty of fair representation; however, he found no
support for enforcement of that duty in § 8(b)(1)(A) or § 8(b)(2) unless the.breach of the
duty on the part of the union occurs as a result of the aggrieved employee's union activity or
inactivity. In Miranda Fuel, the employee's choice of vacation time was unrelated to union
activity. The discrimination on the basis of vacation choice thus may be viewed as analogous
to any discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin which is
clearly unrelated to union activity or inactivity.
5D 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
60 See notes 53 & 55 supra. Section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA states that "[i]t shall be an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ... to refuse to bargain collectively with
an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3)
(1970).
61 147 N.L.R.B. at 1574-75.
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announced in Miranda Fuel. In Miranda Fuel, the union unques-
tionably acted to induce the employer to discriminate against an
employee. 62 However, in Hughes Tool, the union's failure to process
the grievances of black employees, although not an active induce-
ment to the employer to discriminate, was found to fall within the
language of section 8(b)(2)63 which makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice for a union "to cause or attempt to cause" an employer to
engage in discriminatory conduct. The Board seemed to extend
the Miranda Fuel doctrine even further by also finding a violation
of section 8(b)(3)64 grounded upon the union's breach of its duty of
fair representation. The Board thus concluded that the union's
duty to bargain collectively with an employer also encompasses a
duty to represent the claims of all employees in the bargaining
unit, and that a breach of the duty of fair representation in this
context constitutes bad faith bargaining in violation of section
8(b)(3).
The Board in Hughes Tool expressly reasserted the position it
took in Miranda Futel-that a violation of the union's duty of fair
representation was an unfair labor practice to be remedied by the
NLRB. 5 In subsequent decisions involving racial discrimination by
a union, moreover, the Board continued to apply the Miranda Fuel
doctrine. In International Longshoremen's Association (Galveston
Maritime Association),6 6 an arrangement between a union and an
employer whereby three of every four job referrals from the
union's hiring hall were to be given to white employees and white
and black employees were to be segregated from each other on the
job was found by the Board to violate sections 8(b)(1), 8(b)(2), and
8(b)(3) of the NLRA. Similarly, in United Rubber Workers, Local 12
62 See note 51 supra.
63 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970); see note 55 s/pra.
64 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970); see note 60 supra.
65 The Board asserted that the duty of fair representation was enforced by the courts
under the Railway Labor Act only because there was no available administrative remedy:.
When the Supreme Court enunciated the duty of fair representation in ... Railway
Labor Act cases, the Court emphasized in each case the lack of an administrative
remedy as a reason for holding that Federal courts constitute a forum for relief
from breaches of the duty. In this connection, it should be noted that provisions of
the Railway Labor Act which are substantially identical to certain unfair labor
practice provisions of the National Labor Relations Act are enforcible by the
Federal courts, not by an administrative agency . . . . After enactment of the
Taft-Hartley Act, however, an administrative remedy became available in our
view. . ..
147 N.L.R.B. at 1575.
66 148 N.L.R.B.-897 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
837 (1967).
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(Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.), 6 7 the conduct of the union in refusing
to process grievances for black employees who challenged segre-
gated plant facilities and who sought to recover lost wages resulting
from the employer's discriminatory layoff practices was found by
the Board to violate those unfair labor practice provisions. In both
of these decisions, the Board relied on the doctrines it had an-
nounced in Miranda Fuel and Hughes Tool. And notwithstanding
the Second Circuit's denial of enforcement in Miranda Fuel, the
Board's orders in both Galveston Maritime and Goodyear Tire &
Rubber were enforced by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. 68
The Board extended the reach of the fair representation
doctrine even further in combatting union racial discrimination in
Houston Maritime Association.6 9 There, the union had replaced its
practice of refusing to refer blacks from its hiring hall with a policy
of refusing to refer anyone, regardless of race, unless he had been
referred from the hiring hall at a previous time. Although the new
practice technically applied equally to job applicants of all races,
the Board found it to be a violation of sections 8(b)(1) and *8(b)(2)
because it preserved the effects of the former racially discrimina-
tory practices. 70 Thus, the Board's interpretation of the duty of fair
representation appears to require that unions not only avoid en-
gaging in racially discriminatory conduct, but also take affirmative
steps to eliminate the effects of any former discriminatory
conduct.71
67 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1466), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
837 (1967).
68 In United Rubber Workers, Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967), a unanimous panel of the court of appeals agreed with the
Board that a breach of the duty of fair representation violated § 8(b)(1) of the NLRA. The
court found the argument that the union's refusal to process the grievances of black
employees constituted a violation of § 8(b)(1) so persuasive that it found it unnecessary to
pass upon the contention that such conduct also violates § 8(b)(2) and § 8(b)(3).
This precedent was followed by a divided panel of the same court in NLRB v.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Galveston Maritime Ass'n), 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
69 168 N.L.R.B. 615 (1967).
70 Id. at 616-17.
71 In addition to taking jurisdiction over cases involving union racial discrimination
under the unfair labor practice provisions of the NLRA, the Board has taken remedial
actioi against such discrimination in the context of its duty to administer representation
proceedings under § 9 of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970); note 38 supra. For example,
the Board has adopted the policy of withholding the benefit of the contract-bar rule from
the parties to contracts which discriminate between groups of employees by reason of race,
and which thus are violative of the duty of fair representation. When a contract is not
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1078
Although the Board has articulated no counterpart to the
union's duty of fair representation which may constitute a basis for
challenging discrimination on the part of employers as an unfair
labor practice under section 8(a) of the NLRA, the Board has made
it clear that it is not precluded from hearing and deciding cases
involving discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Nor, according to United Packinghouse, are there
any reasons why the Board should not take the active role in
employer discrimination cases that it has taken in cases involving
union discrimination.
72
discriminatory, application of the contract-bar rule would preclude a challenge to a union's
status as bargaining representative by means of a Board election during the first three years
of a contract entered into by the union. See Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962).
In Pioneer Bus, the Board declared that
where the bargaining representative of employees in an appropriate unit executes
separate contracts, or even a single contract, discriminating between Negro and
white employees on racial lines, the Board will not deem such contracts as a bar to
an election.
Id. at 55. Citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954), among other cases, the
Board asserted that its position in Pioneer Bts was "[c]onsistent with clear court decisions in
other contexts which condemn governmental sanctioning of racially separate groupings as
inherently discrimirnatory." 140 N.L.R.B. at 55.
In Hughes Tool, the Board went so far as to revoke union certification where two jointly
certified locals had exclusionary membership policies, one consisting solely of white mem-
bers, the other of black members. For a discussion of the unfair labor practice charges
considered in Hughes Tool, see notes 59-65 and accompanying text supra.
In two recent cases, the Board inquired into charges of sexual and religious discrimina-
tion by unions in determining whether or not their representation petitions would be
processed. See American Mailing Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 80 L.R.R.M. 1294 (1972)
(charges of sex discrimination not proven, E. & R. Webb, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1135 (1972)
(charges of religious discrimination not proven). The implication of the Board's action in
both cases was that if the charges of discriminatory conduct had been proven, a representa-
tion petition by the discriminating union would have been barred. But see Alto Plastics Mfg.
Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 850 (1962) (Board would not inquire into union's background in
certification proceeding). In fact, the rule of Alto Plastics recently has been affirmed. See
Desert Palace, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 818 (1972); Landmark Hotel & Casino, 194 N.L.R.B. 815
(1972).
The remedial powers of the NLRB under § 9 of the NLRA are limited, however, as a
means of eliminating employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. The certification provisions offer no remedy to an aggrieved individual and
include no measures enabling enforcement of an order to eliminate discriminatory practices.
The importance of the Board's actions under these provisions is that they have enabled the
Board to establish a policy condemning discrimination by certified bargaining representa-
tives by using its procedures to place sanctions upon those unions. Of course, discriminatory
practices of employers fall outside the reach of the provisions dealing with union
certification.
72 United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRBi, 416
F.2d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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IV
THE NLRB AND THE EEOC: CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
OVER EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION CASES
Prior to the United Packinghouse73 decision, holding employer
racial discrimination an unfair labor practice under the NLRA,
employer discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin had been proscribed primarily by the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) pursuant to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 74 The two statutes, when read
together, appear to reflect a division of authority between the two
agencies. Although Title VII expressly prohibits an employer from
discriminating against individuals on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin with respect to terms and conditions of
employment, the NLRA was enacted primarily for purposes other
than preventing that type of employment discrimination and does
not contain such an express prohibition. 75 The findings and policy
declaration preceding the substantive sections of the NLRA indi-
cate the desire of Congress to relieve interstate commerce from the
burden of strikes and industrial unrest and to equalize the relative
bargaining powers of employers and employees.76 The type of
discrimination expressly prohibited under the NLRA as an unfair
73 Id.
74 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970). According to § 703 of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail or refuse
' to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual, with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
7' In fact, Congress has rejected amendments to the NLRA which would expressly
make both employer and union discrimination unfair labor practices. See, e.g., S. 1897, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); S. 1831, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); 99 CONG. REC. 4437, 4908
(1953).
However, the rejection of these amendments does not mean that the Board is excluded
from jurisdiction in cases dealing with employment discrimination. Indeed, the courts'
interpretation of the legislative history of both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the NLRA
has been to the contrary-that is, that Congress did not intend to establish the enforcement
provisions of Title VII as the exclusive remedy in employment discrimination cases. See
United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 416 F.2d
1126, 1133 n.I 1 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United Rubber Workers, Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12,
24 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); notes 78-84 and accompanying text infra.
76 29 U.S.C. § 151.
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labor practice is that which encourages or discourages union
membership.
77
Even so, the availability of Title VII as an alternate route for
redress of the type of employer discrimination challenged in United
Packinghouse need not compel a conclusion that the court's finding
of an unfair labor practice based upon such discrimination was
beyond the scope of the NLRA. The language of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 does not preclude NLRB jurisdiction in these matters.
Indeed, the legislative history of Title VII indicates that it was not
intended to limit NLRB jurisdiction. During the Senate debate
over Title VII, Senator Clark introduced a statement from the
Department of Justice indicating that Title VII would not prevent
concurrent jurisdiction under the NLRA. 78 Furthermore, the Se-
nate rejected a proposed amendment to the Civil Rights Act of
1964 which would have made the provisions of Title VII the
exclusive means of relief for discriminatory employment
practices.
79
These actions are evidence that Congress, realizing the differ-
ences between Title VII and the NLRA, intended to permit con-
current jurisdiction over employment discrimination cases under
these two statutes. In fact, recognition of the differences between
the NLRA and Title VII in their application to employer discrimi-
nation cases led the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to
conclude that Congress could not have intended to allow a decision
under one statutory provision to automatically bar a suit under the
77 Id. § 158(a)(3) (1970); see note 24 supra.
78 That letter stated in part:
If a given action should violate both title VII and the National Labor Relations Act,
the National Labor Relations Board would not be deprived of jurisdiction ....
[T]itle VII would have no effect on the duties of any employer or labor organiza-
tion under the NLRA or under the Railway Labor Act, and these duties would
continue to *be enforced as they are now.
110 CONG. REc. 7207 (1964).
79 This amendment was proposed by Senator Tower and subsequently defeated in the
Senate by a vote of 59-29. It would have precluded "any department, agency, or instrumen-
tality in the executive branch of the Government, or any independent agency of the United
States," other than the EEOC, from granting relief. 110 CONG. REc. 13,650-52 (1964).
When the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(Supp. II 1972)) was passed, amending the provisions of Title VII (see note 74 and
accompanying text supra), the House and Senate Conference Committee also excluded a
provision from the final version of the bill which would have made the EEOC the sole
federal authority to combat employment discrimination. Supporters of the House version of
the bill, which would have included an exclusive jurisdiction provision, were of the view that
the failure to make the EEOC an exclusive remedy merely encourages an individual who lost
his case in one forum under one statute to relitigate his case in still another forum under
another federal statute. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1971).
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other statutory scheme. s0 This particular result of concurrent
jurisdiction was cautioned against by supporters of provisions to
make Title VII an exclusive federal remedy in employment dis-
crimination cases.
8 '
The case before the Sixth Circuit, Tipler v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours,8 2 involved an action under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by
a discharged employee seeking reinstatement, back pay, general
relief, and an injunction against future- racially discriminatory
practices. This action followed a dismissal of the employee's claim
by the NLRB. 3 The court of appeals affirmed a district court
ruling that the determination of the NLRB trial examiner that the
employee was not dismissed because of personal malice in the form
of racial bias, did not, under the doctrine of res judicata or
collateral estoppel, preclude the employee from subsequently as-
serting, in an action under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that he had
been discharged because of racial prejudice.
Although the Tipler court acknowledged the applicability of
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to administra-
tive decisions, it asserted that the differences between Title VII
and the NLRA make the application of these doctrines inappro-
priate to suits brought under both statutes.84 Although it cited the
United Packinghouse decision, the court explained that racial dis-
crimination in employment may be an unfair labor practice under
section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA if the discrimination is unjustified and
interferes with the employees' right to take concerted action for
their own aid or protection. 85 On the other hand, discrimination in
80 Tipler v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128-30 (6th Cir. 1971).
81 See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
82 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971).
83 The plaintiff was a black laborer who successfully participated in a union election
which ousted the employer's white foreman from a position of leadership in a 95% black
union. The plaintiff was subsequently discharged on May 5, 1967. On May 8, he filed a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging that the discharge was racially motivated.
Based upon an investigation in which it found reasonable cause to believe the employer had
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC issued a Notice of a Right To
Sue on August 19, 1969, more than two years later.
During the interim period, on May 11, 1967, the plaintiff also filed a charge with the
NLRB alleging that he had been discharged in violation of § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA. The NLRB accepted the trial examiner's recommendation that the charges be
dismissed. Id. at 127.
84 Id. at 128-29.
85 Id. at 129. The Sixth Circuit clearly indicates in its analysis of employer discrimina-
tion under the NLRA that it does not interpret the United Packinghouse case as establishing a
per se rule with respect to employer discrimination as a violation of § 8(a)(1). Indeed, the
need to show an interference with the employees' right to unite under the NLRA is
19741 1093
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employment is prohibited under Title VII without reference to the
effect on the employees' right to act concertedly for their own
benefit. Hence, Title VII may prohibit discriminatory practices
which are valid under the NLRA. 86 It is therefore evident, accord-
ing to the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, that a determination
under one of these statutes does not preclude a determination
under the other because the variant standards of the statutes
require the consideration of different factors.
7
V
THE NLRB AND THE EEOC: COMPARISON OF FORUMS
Title VII, as originally drafted, conferred enforcement powers
on the EEOC. However, these powers were deleted in the final
version of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, leaving the Commission only
advisory and conciliatory responsibilities. 8 Until 1972, attempts to
pass amendments giving the Commission enforcement powers had
failed.s 9 As a result of the EEOC's lack of enforcement powers it
had no more than a mihimal impact in eliminating employment
discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 90 The provisions creating the Commission therefore were
subject to severe criticism. 91
considered by the court to be the feature which distinguishes the grounds for relief under
that Act from the grounds for relief under Title VII. See notes 86-87 and accompanying text
infra.
86 443 F.2d at 129.
87 The primary concern of the NLRB trial examiner was the relationship of the
employee's union activities to his discharge. See note 83 supra. Consequently, according to
the Sixth Circuit, the trial examiner did not fully explore the racial aspects of the case which
would be considered in an action under Title VII. 443 F.2d at 129.
However, if the United Packinghouse decision were accepted as establishing that employer
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin constituted a per se
violation of § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, it would appear that the grounds for relief under both
the NLRA and Title VII would, in effect, be the same. Under this interpretation, a finding
of discrimination tinder one of these statutes would apparently mandate a similar finding
under the other.
s See Note, supra note 1, at 944 n.7.
89 See, e.g., S. 3465, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R. 10065, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966).
90 Statistics on the progress of equal employment opportunities clearly reveal that the
voluntary approach has failed. Of 34,455 charges before the EEOC that were recommended
for investigation, reasonable cause was found in over 63% of the cases, but in less than half
of these cases was the Commission able to achieve a successful conciliation. H.R. REP. No.
238, supra note 79, at 3-4.
", For example, Senator Javits, speaking on behalf of an amendment to Title VII
granting enforcement powers to the EEOC, commented:
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In light of these facts, Judge Wright's opinion in United
Packinghouse in 1969 may be viewed as a response to the need for a
means of administrative enforcement of the national policy against
discrimination by employers. The opinion notes that the EEOC has
no enforcement powers of its own, thereby leaving the individual
with only judicial remedies to enforce his rights. 92 By actively
asserting the concurrent jurisdiction of the NLRB to hear and
decide cases involving employer discrimination which are not di-
rectly related to union activity, the District of Columbia Circuit
offered to employees aggrieved by racial discrimination a far more
attractive means of relief than could be provided by the EEOC
alone. The advantages of the NLRB as a forum for hearing racial
discrimination cases had been previously enumerated in 1966:
Primarily because the NRLB bears the expenses of enforcement
of the NLRA, offers the other general advantages of administra-
tive enforcement, has a backlog ... six months shorter than...
the federal district courts, and has no express requirement to
defer to state FEP [Fair Employment Practices] agencies, rep-
resentatives of civil rights organizations have preferred NLRB
enforcement over title VII enforcement of FEP. 93
By 1972, discontent with the EEOC's lack of enforcement
powers had grown sufficient to move the Congress to pass the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which granted new
powers to the Commission. 94 The purpose of the new legislation, as
indicated in the House Report on the bill, was to grant the EEOC
"authority to issue, through well established procedures, judicially
enforceable cease and desist orders. '' 95 Thus, under the new
amendments to Title VII, the EEOC has the power to seek pre-
liminary injunctive relief9 6 where an employer is shown to be
engaging in discriminatory employment practices and has the
authority to bring civil actions in pattern and practice discrimina-
tion suits.
97
... [T]itle VII pays lip service to the idea of equal employment opportunity, but the
hard fact is that the compromise worked out in 1964 under which .the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission was emasculated, has gone far to destroy
the act as an effective tool to end discrimination in employment in this country.
114 CONG. REC. 16,910 (1968).
92 416 F.2d at 1133 n.11.
93 Rosen, Division of Authority Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Preliminay
Study in Federal-State Interagency Relations, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 846, 887 (1966) (footnotes
omitted).
94 H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 79, at 3-5.
95 Id. at 1.
96 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(2),(g) (Supp. H 1972).




An examination of the legislative history of both the NLRA
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reveals that Congress did not
intend to preclude the NLRB from taking jurisdiction in cases
involving employment discrimination on the part of unions or
employers. However, the position taken by the United Packinghouse
court, if viewed as a rule making employer discrimination a per e
violation of section 8(a)(1) of the NRLA, seems to stretch the
language of the statute to cover situations where the employees'
rights under section 7 of the Act are at most only remotely
endangered.
In retrospect, the United Packinghouse decision seems to have
filled a gap created by the EEOC's lack of enforcement powers to
deal with the employer discrimination which was challenged. How-
ever, with increased powers of enforcement granted the EEOC in
1972, the broad pronouncements of the United Packingho use court
no longer serve a necessary function. Under these circumstances,
the NLRB's approach in Jubilee, which demanded evidence of a
nexus between the employer's discriminatory practices and the
interference with the employee's rights under section 7 of the
NLRA, appears to be the better reasoned statutory interpretation.
Marcia L. Goldstein
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